I do not profess to be a Hegelian scholar -- not by a long shot. The deeper I go into Hegel and Hegelian thinking, the more sophisticated my arguments will likely get relative to what I am arguing about. But I'm on a time clock here. The time clock is my life. Hegel is a very complicated -- and sometimes frustratingly abstract and convoluted -- thinker.
I don't wish to spend the rest of my lifetime focusing and specializing only on Hegel. And I have said this before -- I do not wish to take my arguments into the furthest reaches of philosophical outer space to the point where you, my most esteemed readers, cannot understand me anymore than either you or I can understand Hegel at his abstract worst.
Hegel -- not unlike many other philosophical geniuses, and/or geniuses from other fields -- created a philosophy that could be, and was, profoundly revolutionary one moment (such as in his articulation of the nature of 'dialectical thinking' or 'dialectical logic) and bizarrely abstract, obtuse, convoluted, and/or self-contradictory another moment. (such as in probably his most controversial and profoundly stupid meaningless statement of his career: 'The real is the rational, and the rational is the real.' How is that for white-washing, sugar-coating, and sucking up to Prussian Kings?).
One has to ask oneself: How can a thinker of Hegel's stature argue on the one hand that, 'The real is the rational, and the rational is the real.', and on the other hand argue in 'The Philosophy of Right' that moral subjectivism is a bad thing because it can be used to justify any crime. (Lloyd Spencer, Introducing Hegel, pg. 102)?
No kidding -- Sherlock. And what, Mr. Hegel, do you think about the inherently self-contradictory logic between your statement of supposed wisdom -- 'The real is the rational, and the rational is the real.' -- as compared to your other statement in another context is supposedly equal or better wisdom ('The Philosophy of Right') that 'moral relativism' is a bad thing. Explain this apparent self-contradiction, will you please, Mr. Hegel? Obviously, you can't because you are dead. So if any of your most beloved students -- of which I partly claim to be one -- can pick up this apparent self-contradiction in your logic, and explain it way, like snow melting off the ground in spring, then, by all means, please pick up the dialectic here in your absence. I, personally, remain quiet because I see no way of explaining this self-contradiction away.
There are ways of seemingly justifying this Hegelian eye-sore. I will take up the task of my potential Hegelian protagonists and protectionists. We can justify it on the ground of 'historical determinism' and/or 'teleological determinism' -- the logic would run something like this: If you think in terms of where reality has come from and/or where it is going, then the present reality becomes a 'justified, rational, necessary reality'. But it still boils down to moral-ethical relativism, which in effect is moral-ethical white-washing -- and hogwash. The present reality -- no matter how corrupt and criminal it may be -- is 'dialectically justified' on the basis that it is a 'temporary phase of dialectical evolution' -- and 'rationally necessary for this ongoing evolution'. Again -- hogwash -- and justification for sitting on your hands and doing nothing about individual, social, legal, economic, political, and environmental moral-ethical transgressions, improprieties, corruptions, crimes...
We could also sit here forever and play 'cat and mouse definition games'. This is what Hegel meant by 'rational' and this is what Hegel meant by 'real'. No, he didn't -- he meant this. And so on.
The deeper we dive -- or the higher we soar -- into this verbal conundrum, the more mixed up and confused we will get. Word and mind games that will take us nowhere except on a magic carpet ride. It's like bobbing for apples and trying to grab the apple with your tongue. It might be a fun game to play at a halloween party when you're drunk and in mixed company but if you are serious about grabbing the apple, it is not going to happen -- unless you use your hands and/or your teeth.
And so it is with Hegel. If you want to make practical sense of Hegel -- as with any philosopher that delves too much in the abstract, then you have to use your hands and your teeth to clear away the abstractions, the conundrums, the self-contradictions, the word play, and the mind-games. Otherwise, you will be bobbing for apples for a long, long time -- about as long as it will take man's Spirit, or God's Spirit, or the Universe's Spirit to totally enlighten itself with 'Absolute Knowledge'. Try totally enlightening yourself with 'Absolute Balderdash' -- and you will be closer to the truth.
This brings me to my last point and Hegel's last 'self-contradiction' that I will talk about here.
Firstly, let me be clear on this point: I am a huge proponent of the value of dialectic thinking -- and that's what 'Hegel's Hotel' is -- it is an evolving philosophical treatise that is built from dialectic thinking -- thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. My philosophy used to be called 'Gap Philosophy' -- it philosophizes in the 'gaps'. 'DGBN' stands for 'Dialectical Gap-Bridging Negotiations'.
However, this having been said, dialectical thinking is simply one important means to an end -- and that end is 'more functional, pragmatic, practical knowing (epistemology), being or living (ontology), and becoming (teleology)'.
Dialectic thinking and negotiating does not always work. Sometimes it might bring us to an impasse, a stalemate. Othertimes, it just may not be the type of logic and/or thinking that we should be using in a particular context. Maybe we should be using Aristolean-Kierkgaardian 'either/or' logic. Or Bush's infamous 'unilateral logic'. (If the United Nations does not want to support us in our invasion of Iraq, then we will go it alone -- unilateralism -- or we will lead an 'army of the willing'.)
If you choose to use Aristotlean-Kierkgaardian 'either/or' logic, then you might think something like this: Either you can be married or you can be single -- but you can't be both. You can't 'have your cake and eat it too'.
If you are a 'unilateral thinker', you might argue something like this: I don't care what my husband or wife thinks or feels; I will do what I want, regardless. (Such a person is not likely to have a very long marriage unless he or she has a very submissive, subservient husband or wife. Similarily, international political unilateralness is not particularly good for international diplomatic relations -- when you are looking for foreign support and help down the road, don't expect it to be there after you have basically 'dissed' and 'dismissed' the countries that you are now asking for support and help from.)
Now 'dialectical thinkers' are always looking for different ways in which they can 'have their cake and eat it too'.
But here too, we need to differentiate between different types of dialectical thinkers, such as:
1. 'Unilateral dialectic thinkers': Here we apply and practise dialectic thinking within ourselves. For example, I read Adam Smith and/or Ayn Rand, and then I read Karl Marx and/or Erich Fromm, and then I try to find a 'working synthesis' between 'Smith's and Rand's ideal Capitalism' vs. 'Marx's and Fromm's ideal socialism'. Or going back to my first example, I try to 'split the difference between being married and being single -- and still keep my wife.' And there is many different potential places that this type of dialectical thinking could take either you or me as we try to creatively balance such things as: narcissism (sexual drive, security...), empathy, altruism, morals, ethics -- and staying married.
2. 'Bilateral dialectical thinkers': Here two different thinkers sit down and try to work out a conflict resolution to whatever the disagreement or conflict is. I probably wouldn't recommend this for most married couples who want to stay married unless you are both very open-minded and liberal. Discussions about past, present, and/or future potential 'infidelity encounters' don't usually go over too well with the husband or wife. I tried this type of discussion once and let's just say that I probably will never try to do it again -- not with someone I am intimately involved with.
It's probably a good thing that God/Nature generally starts to lower the sex drive around 50 to 60; otherwise, it's scary to think how much more biological, psychological, and philosophical chaos could be thrown into the lives of 'civilized' people. So much for wisdom -- and peace of mind - in old age. Nursing homes out of control. Kids with changing grandfathers and grandmothers -- and not just because their fathers and mothers, or step-fathers and step-mothers, were changing. I'm trying partly to be humorous here but underneath the partly intended humor is an incredible amount of human and family pain, pathos, traumacy, and tragedy.
You want to talk about biological, psychological, and philosophical contradictions. There is no greater human contradiction -- at least for many if not most people -- between the drive, or shall we say, 'ethical restraint', to be 'monogomous' vs. the drive to be 'non-monogomous'.
For some, this may be a 'no-contest' conflict -- one way or the other; but for others -- like myself -- it may be a lifelong biological, psychological, and philosophical -- conflict/problem. If, some day, some philosopher finds a good working biological-psychological-philosophical dialectical conflict resolution to this problem that results in a better type of 'self and social homeostatic balance' than the one we currently have relative to this issue, such a philosopher would deserve to become a millionare. Because right now, the co-relation between: marital infidelity, possessiveness and jealousy, family instability, domestic violence, and family self-destruction -- has got to be huge.
Finally, to finish my last point. Dialectical thinking and logic has no boundaries, no limit to where it can take us. Even on one conflict issue, different dialectical thinkers could -- whether it be one, two, three, or a hundred people working together to resolve the same conflict-issue -- could probably come up with a virtually endless combination of workable or non-workable conflict-solutions/resolutions on this particular issue. Plus there are an infinite number of possible conflict issues out there in the real or imagined world we have to live in.
Thus, the potential 'end solutions' -- and their 'negation' -- and their 'counter-negation' and their endless number of potential integrations/syntheses are as infinite as the universe itself. Never will their ever be any arrival at 'Absolute Knowledge' because, according to dialectic logic, even 'Absolute Knowledge' would have to be subject to its own negation -- and further integration.
Conclusion: Dialectical thinking is incompatible and contradictory with any talk of 'Absolute Knowledge'. So once again, 'Absolute Knowledge' is a non-contributing factor in the evolution of DGB Philosophy.
That is enough for today on this subject matter. Have a great dialectical day. And may you work your way through your unsuccessful dialectic integrations -- to get to your successful ones that hopefully will make you happy.
-- dgb, Aug. 10th, 2008.
Sunday, August 10, 2008
Faceoff: Hegel vs. DGB Philosophy: Part 1: On Absolute Knowledge and Historical Determination
It is not by accident that I have called my work here 'Hegel's Hotel'. I view Hegel as the greatest single influence on my philosophical perspective and work.
Either directly -- or indirectly through Perls and Gestalt Therapy, through Freud and Psychoanalysis, through Jung and Jungian Psychology, through Berne and Transactional Analysis, through Nietzsche and 'The Birth of Tragedy' -- Hegel has taught me to think dialectically.
In the newest version of 'Introducing Hegel' -- a great series of books for introductory and advanced philosophy students alike, this one written by Lloyd Spencer, 1996, 2006 -- it states on the back cover:
'George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is one of the greatest thinkers of all time. No other philosopher has had such a profound impact on the ideas and political events of the 20th century.'
(And his influence is not slowing down in the 21st century -- my addition.)
.....................................................................................
Having said this, it is important to recognize some points of divergence between Hegel's philosophy and DGB Philosophy.
Before I start, it must be stated that I have the evolutionary advantage, if you will, of having access to a great number of 'post-Hegelian' and 'anti-Hegelian' thinkers -- mainly philosophers and psychologists -- since Hegel died in 1831. Included in these are: Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida, Freud, Jung, Adler, Perls, and more... More philosophical-psychological food to be processed -- or as Lloyd Spencer writes -- 'grist for the excerpt mill' (Introducing Hegel, pg. 9). Now let's look at some of our disagreements.
...................................................................................
1. Absolute Knowledge
You will never see the two terms 'Absolute Knowledge' thrown together in DGB Philosophy except in quoting Hegel. There is no DGB Idealism in these two terms. I simply don't use them. For DGB Philosophy, all knowledge is relative and subject to change. This does not mean that there is not some knowledge that is better than other knowledge. For example, the concept of 'bi-lateral, two-directional, causality' is generally a superior concept to 'unilateral, one-directional causality' but even here context can, and usually does, mean everything. Also, everything is subject to change (Heraclitus, Korzybski, Perls, Gestalt Therapy).
No generalization is right all the time. That is why they are called generalizations. Stereotypes are particularly dangerous types of generalizations that can, and often do, cause more human pain than they are worth. From human stereotypes comes human discrimination -- and reverse discrimination -- where individuals are judged by the stereotypes they are branded by, not by their individual differences. From discrimination comes preferential treatment, unfair treatment, and unequal rights -- the anti-thesis of democracy.
Back to the theme of absolute knowledge. Man is imperfect. Man's epistemology (knowledge) is imperfect. It doesn't matter how many times we run it through the 'dialectic grist mill' -- or not -- it always will be. Every thesis will open up new anti-theses or counter-theses. Every conflict-resolution will open up new conflicts. Every problem-solution will open up new problems. Every cure will have a new side-effect. Again, these are all generalizations but I believe generally good ones. Do you really think that we have less problems today than when Hegel was philosophizing? To be sure, our knowledge is better and greater. But does anyone really not think that it won't be much better in another 200 years? And another 200 years after that? That is, assuming that we have not completely self-destructed from global warming, polluting the world, and/or war.
There are still an infinite number of life mysteries regarding ourselves, our biological, chemical, and psychological make-up, and the make-up of the world around us. Nobody in our lifetime is going to see 'Absolute Knowledge'. We are far more likely to see 'Absolute Destruction' (due to man's narcissistic greed and power-mongering).
...................................................................................
2. Historical Determinism
I am not a 'hard-line historical deteminist'; maybe a 'soft-line historical determinist'. I play the dialect between historical determinism and historical existentialism/freedom.
Example One: When America (Bush, Congress, etc.) thumbed its nose at the United Nations, and was going invade Iraq with or without the UN's approval, I wrote an essay saying that this was a big political mistake. Disregarding the fact that the epistemology ('weapons of mass destruction' and 'national security') used to justify the war turned out to be false, I felt that the principle -- and action -- of 'international unilateralism' put into play by the U.S. was gross hypocrisy from a country that was trying to preach and teach 'international democracy'. Not to mention the fact that it created a huge international 'tide reversal' from other countries empathizing with the U.S. and supporting their chase of Al Queda and the Taliban -- to other countries turning against the U.S. for their gross United Nations and multi-national disrespect, and turning away from their chase of Al Queda and the Taliban in order to start another war.
Now Bob Dylan is purported to have said -- if we are to trust the 'epistemological validity' of the movie, 'I'm Not There' -- that he didn't believe that any of his songs was capable of generating social change. If he's right about that -- and certainly Dylan wrote some wonderful political protest masterpieces such as: The Times They Are a Changin, Blowin in the Wind, Masters of War, God on Our Side, Hattie Caroll, Emmitt Til, Hard Rain's a Gonna Fall, It's Alright Ma, I'm Only Bleeding, Balland of a Thin Man, Subterranean Homesick Blues...and many, many more --then how can I possibly believe that any of my political protest essays is going to do any better? That one day my essays will only be 'blowin in the wind' with far less fanfare than anything Dylan wrote.
My answer to this sense of 'political protest futility' is this: If only one person puts only one sandbag on the bank of the Mississipi River to prevent a flood, it is not going to do any more than 'one sandbag' of good. However, if a thousand different people each put one sandbag on the bank of the river it is going to do considerable more good at stopping a flood. Even more so if you have a thousand people each putting ten sandbags on the bank of the Mississippi River -- particularly at its most dangerous points -- and so on as you increase the number of people contributing to the process, and the more each person contributes.
We may or may not look back at the first contributer (usually we do) -- a Jackie Robinson or a Martin Luther King -- and say, 'Gee, what a wonderful process that that man or woman started...'
History usually takes more than one person to turn a tide of political change but it usually takes one or two brave and/or insightful people to start the process -- Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin... There is usually a combination of historical individualism, courage, and existential freedom, combined with 'the almost deterministic drive of the dialectic and the democratic will of the people to compensate for and correct political/legal/economic/philosophical/scientific errors and injustices of any type.
One person doesn't usually generate social and/or political change all by him or herself. Put together a group of people united in the same direction, each making their own individual contributions to the group, and more power and momentum starts to establish itself. This is how you get the beginning of political parties and/or poltical lobbyist groups. Once the 'cause' spreads to 'hundreds or thousands of people' change is likely going to come -- unless you have a strong, military dictatorship holding them back. And eventually, the dictatorship will topple -- particularly if it is not supporting the 'will of the people'.
Anaxamander -- the second oldest Greek philosopher -- was astoundingly astute. He had incredible insight into the dynamics of 'power dialectics' -- of 'cosmic justice'. In his own way, Anaxamander said: 'What goes around, comes around.' -- and who amongst you, doesn't at least partly believe in that prophetic piece of wisdom.
History -- human history -- continues to move forward using a combination of individual freedom and willpower in conjunction with historical determinism, the will of the people, the drive of the dialectic -- and cosmic justice.
-- dgb, Aug. 4th, 2008.
Either directly -- or indirectly through Perls and Gestalt Therapy, through Freud and Psychoanalysis, through Jung and Jungian Psychology, through Berne and Transactional Analysis, through Nietzsche and 'The Birth of Tragedy' -- Hegel has taught me to think dialectically.
In the newest version of 'Introducing Hegel' -- a great series of books for introductory and advanced philosophy students alike, this one written by Lloyd Spencer, 1996, 2006 -- it states on the back cover:
'George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is one of the greatest thinkers of all time. No other philosopher has had such a profound impact on the ideas and political events of the 20th century.'
(And his influence is not slowing down in the 21st century -- my addition.)
.....................................................................................
Having said this, it is important to recognize some points of divergence between Hegel's philosophy and DGB Philosophy.
Before I start, it must be stated that I have the evolutionary advantage, if you will, of having access to a great number of 'post-Hegelian' and 'anti-Hegelian' thinkers -- mainly philosophers and psychologists -- since Hegel died in 1831. Included in these are: Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida, Freud, Jung, Adler, Perls, and more... More philosophical-psychological food to be processed -- or as Lloyd Spencer writes -- 'grist for the excerpt mill' (Introducing Hegel, pg. 9). Now let's look at some of our disagreements.
...................................................................................
1. Absolute Knowledge
You will never see the two terms 'Absolute Knowledge' thrown together in DGB Philosophy except in quoting Hegel. There is no DGB Idealism in these two terms. I simply don't use them. For DGB Philosophy, all knowledge is relative and subject to change. This does not mean that there is not some knowledge that is better than other knowledge. For example, the concept of 'bi-lateral, two-directional, causality' is generally a superior concept to 'unilateral, one-directional causality' but even here context can, and usually does, mean everything. Also, everything is subject to change (Heraclitus, Korzybski, Perls, Gestalt Therapy).
No generalization is right all the time. That is why they are called generalizations. Stereotypes are particularly dangerous types of generalizations that can, and often do, cause more human pain than they are worth. From human stereotypes comes human discrimination -- and reverse discrimination -- where individuals are judged by the stereotypes they are branded by, not by their individual differences. From discrimination comes preferential treatment, unfair treatment, and unequal rights -- the anti-thesis of democracy.
Back to the theme of absolute knowledge. Man is imperfect. Man's epistemology (knowledge) is imperfect. It doesn't matter how many times we run it through the 'dialectic grist mill' -- or not -- it always will be. Every thesis will open up new anti-theses or counter-theses. Every conflict-resolution will open up new conflicts. Every problem-solution will open up new problems. Every cure will have a new side-effect. Again, these are all generalizations but I believe generally good ones. Do you really think that we have less problems today than when Hegel was philosophizing? To be sure, our knowledge is better and greater. But does anyone really not think that it won't be much better in another 200 years? And another 200 years after that? That is, assuming that we have not completely self-destructed from global warming, polluting the world, and/or war.
There are still an infinite number of life mysteries regarding ourselves, our biological, chemical, and psychological make-up, and the make-up of the world around us. Nobody in our lifetime is going to see 'Absolute Knowledge'. We are far more likely to see 'Absolute Destruction' (due to man's narcissistic greed and power-mongering).
...................................................................................
2. Historical Determinism
I am not a 'hard-line historical deteminist'; maybe a 'soft-line historical determinist'. I play the dialect between historical determinism and historical existentialism/freedom.
Example One: When America (Bush, Congress, etc.) thumbed its nose at the United Nations, and was going invade Iraq with or without the UN's approval, I wrote an essay saying that this was a big political mistake. Disregarding the fact that the epistemology ('weapons of mass destruction' and 'national security') used to justify the war turned out to be false, I felt that the principle -- and action -- of 'international unilateralism' put into play by the U.S. was gross hypocrisy from a country that was trying to preach and teach 'international democracy'. Not to mention the fact that it created a huge international 'tide reversal' from other countries empathizing with the U.S. and supporting their chase of Al Queda and the Taliban -- to other countries turning against the U.S. for their gross United Nations and multi-national disrespect, and turning away from their chase of Al Queda and the Taliban in order to start another war.
Now Bob Dylan is purported to have said -- if we are to trust the 'epistemological validity' of the movie, 'I'm Not There' -- that he didn't believe that any of his songs was capable of generating social change. If he's right about that -- and certainly Dylan wrote some wonderful political protest masterpieces such as: The Times They Are a Changin, Blowin in the Wind, Masters of War, God on Our Side, Hattie Caroll, Emmitt Til, Hard Rain's a Gonna Fall, It's Alright Ma, I'm Only Bleeding, Balland of a Thin Man, Subterranean Homesick Blues...and many, many more --then how can I possibly believe that any of my political protest essays is going to do any better? That one day my essays will only be 'blowin in the wind' with far less fanfare than anything Dylan wrote.
My answer to this sense of 'political protest futility' is this: If only one person puts only one sandbag on the bank of the Mississipi River to prevent a flood, it is not going to do any more than 'one sandbag' of good. However, if a thousand different people each put one sandbag on the bank of the river it is going to do considerable more good at stopping a flood. Even more so if you have a thousand people each putting ten sandbags on the bank of the Mississippi River -- particularly at its most dangerous points -- and so on as you increase the number of people contributing to the process, and the more each person contributes.
We may or may not look back at the first contributer (usually we do) -- a Jackie Robinson or a Martin Luther King -- and say, 'Gee, what a wonderful process that that man or woman started...'
History usually takes more than one person to turn a tide of political change but it usually takes one or two brave and/or insightful people to start the process -- Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin... There is usually a combination of historical individualism, courage, and existential freedom, combined with 'the almost deterministic drive of the dialectic and the democratic will of the people to compensate for and correct political/legal/economic/philosophical/scientific errors and injustices of any type.
One person doesn't usually generate social and/or political change all by him or herself. Put together a group of people united in the same direction, each making their own individual contributions to the group, and more power and momentum starts to establish itself. This is how you get the beginning of political parties and/or poltical lobbyist groups. Once the 'cause' spreads to 'hundreds or thousands of people' change is likely going to come -- unless you have a strong, military dictatorship holding them back. And eventually, the dictatorship will topple -- particularly if it is not supporting the 'will of the people'.
Anaxamander -- the second oldest Greek philosopher -- was astoundingly astute. He had incredible insight into the dynamics of 'power dialectics' -- of 'cosmic justice'. In his own way, Anaxamander said: 'What goes around, comes around.' -- and who amongst you, doesn't at least partly believe in that prophetic piece of wisdom.
History -- human history -- continues to move forward using a combination of individual freedom and willpower in conjunction with historical determinism, the will of the people, the drive of the dialectic -- and cosmic justice.
-- dgb, Aug. 4th, 2008.
Thursday, December 27, 2007
Kant vs. DGB Philosophy: Kant Re-visited
This essay was written about 9 months ago and then just re-written a couple of weeks ago (August 9th, 2008). Now, I am re-addressing the essay for a third and hopefully final time. However, perhaps with a hopefully better and better knowledge of Kant in the months or years to come, I will have to rewrite this essay again at some future point. Time will tell. This essay is based on new information I am presently getting about Kant.
-- dgb, Aug. 23rd, 2008.
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From Wikipedia...on the internet...see Kant...
Immanuel Kant (IPA: [ɪmanuəl kant]; 22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804) was an 18th-century German philosopher from the Prussian city of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia). He is regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of modern Europe and of the late Enlightenment.
His most important work is the Critique of Pure Reason, a critical investigation of reason itself. It encompasses an attack on traditional metaphysics and epistemology, and highlights Kant's own contribution to these areas. The other main works of his maturity are the Critique of Practical Reason, which concentrates on ethics, and the Critique of Judgement, which investigates aesthetics and teleology.
Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological priorities were to find out whether metaphysics, the science of ultimate reality, is possible. He asked if an object has certain properties prior to the experience of that object. He concluded that all objects that the mind can think about must conform to its manner of thought. Therefore if the mind can only think in terms of causality -- which he concluded that it does -- then we can know prior to experiencing them that all objects we experience must either be a cause or an effect. However, it follows from this, that it is possible that there are objects of such a nature that the mind cannot think of them, and so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside of experience: hence we cannot know, for example, whether the world always existed or if it had a cause. And so the grand questions of speculative metaphysics are off limits, but the sciences are firmly grounded in laws of the mind.[1]
In this sense, Kant believed himself to be creating a compromise between the empiricists and the rationalists. The former, according to Kant, believe that knowledge necessarily comes from experience, and that experience can yield only imperfect laws of nature, that past events do not predict future events. Therefore, there is no sound foundation for science. Knowledge of our selves, the external world and causality are off limits. The latter believed that reason alone provides us with certain truths that can provide a sound foundation for science. Kant said we can know some things through reason, but these things are only of how the world appears to us, and that the world we know is objective, compromising with the empiricists. But he also said that what we know through pure reason can only be applied to experience, and that it is through experience that we get most of our knowledge, compromising with the rationalists.
Kant’s thought was very influential in Germany while he was still alive, moving philosophy beyond the debate between the rationalists and empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer all saw themselves as correcting and expanding the Kantian system, thus bringing about German Idealism. Kant continues to be a major influence on philosophy to this day, influencing both Analytic and Continental Philosophy.
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From Wikiquote...on the internet...see Kant...
Critique of Pure Reason (1787)
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer. (Preface, A vii)
Abbot Terrasson tells us that if the size of a book were measured not by the number of its pages but by the time required to understand it, then we could say about many books that they would be much shorter were they not so short. (A xviii)
Criticism alone can sever the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which can be injurious universally; as well as of idealism and skepticism, which are dangerous chiefly to the Schools, and hardly allow of being handed on to the public. (Preface to 2nd edition, B xxxiv)
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. (B 1)
The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space. (B 8)
Thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. (B 75)
Sometimes paraphrased: "Concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind."
A plant, an animal, the regular order of nature—probably also the disposition of the whole universe—give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind—just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions; that, notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individually, unchangeably, and completely determined, and are the original causes of things; and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea. (B 374)
Metaphysics has as the proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality. (B 395)
Human reason is by nature architectonic. (B 502)
Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas. (B 730)
All the interests of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? (B 832-833)
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Kant vs. DGB Philosophy: Kant Re-visited
I will say this about Immanuel Kant: for me, he is the most difficult philosopher that I have ever had the cognitive pain -- or shall we say the cognitive exercise -- of trying to understand, of trying to figure out just exactly what he said and what he meant. Let us make the dualistic, and dialectic, distinction -- as Kant himself is most famously known for -- between: 1. Kant-the-person-in-himself-and-what-he-believed; vs. 2. my subjective understanding of the-either-knowable-and/or-unknowable-so-called-objective-Kant-and-what-he-believed.
Did you follow that distinction? This is as difficult as epistemology gets -- or at least it is where Kant took it, and where I am trying to follow. The 'subjective/objective' problem is arguably one of the two or three most difficult metaphysical problems in the history of philosophy. I put it right up there with the 'mind/body' dualism and the 'religion/atheism' dualism.
Now to be a 'dialectic philosopher' in the sense that I mean being a dialectic philosopher means that we seek to integrate or synthesize all dualities or apparent paradoxes/contradictions/polarities/conflicts/impasses. And so this is what we shall aim to do here.
Complicating the problem here, is the separate problem of 'sound and/or visual bites'.
I have read different authors -- different interpreters of Kant -- and come away with different interpretations of what Kant said and what he meant. This problem is critical to what we are trying to do here because if my understanding of Kant and what he said/meant is wrong, then everything that I write here is also wrong and subject to both re-interpretation and re-evaluation. Similarily, with anything I might have written previously about Kant and this same problem of the 'subjective/objective split'.
At the heart of the matter is this philosophical question: Can we directly know what is in our 'objective world'(Kant's outdated term for 'objective' was 'noumenal') and/or is it colored by the subjective nature of our own 'cognitive-evaluative processing brain-mind-psyche' -- specifically, the unique individual combination of our senses, percepts, power of reasoning/logic, understanding of 'causality', time, space, and structure, concepts, generalizations, abstractions, value-judgments...anything we use to help us (or hinder us) to better understand our 'objective world' and/or the 'thing-in-itself'?
This question -- the Kantian epistemological question -- encompasses two rather large 'semantic time-bombs' that turn the question into a 'epistemologist's living nightmare'. I think the question messed up a lot of people's minds back in Kant's day, as it is still at least partly doing today. Focus too hard on the question and your mind might explode. It will take you on one of those 'magic carpet rides' that I keep writing about relative to any philosopher who wants to 'fly high with you and not return you to the ground -- to the stability of the earth beneath your feet.' Certain philosophers -- to name a few -- Parmedines, Plato, Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Wittgenstein... -- have been very good at taking us on 'fly-high-with-me-magic carpet rides'. When reading them -- if we are dialectically bound by the cognitive interplay between the sky and the earth, between the abstract and the concrete particularities, then there comes a time when we are reading these philosophers when we have to blow the whistle on them, and tell them to either take us back to earth again -- or we are taking over the controls. Back to earth we go.
The crux of the semantic problem with the Kantian epistemological question are these two words: Can we directly know...?
That is the semantically loaded, time-bomb part of the question -- the part that will quite possibly drive you to drink, take you over the deep end, and/or cognitively blow your mind, if you focus too hard on it, and you don't see the potential 'double meaning contradiction' in the question.
Kant's epistemological question is very simlar to this one: Is the glass half full or half empty -- which is it?
If you fall for the question -- then you have been epistemologically trapped -- with no way out of this apparent epistemological conundrum.
Back up a moment -- and approach the question properly -- and you can become untrapped.
You answer the epistemological question the same way you answer the 'half-full, half-empty drink' question.
It depends on your perspective.
Are you an optimist or a pessimist?
Are you a Humean epistemological skeptic and pessimist; or are you a Hegelian epistemological idealist?
Or are you a Bainian multi-dialectic 'skeptic-pessimist-optimist'?; a Bainian multi-dialectic 'epistemological realist-idealist'?
Let's look at it this way. Every person's sensory-perceptual-conceptual-evaluative system is different -- and some are better than others. But even this is relative over time. Let me explain.
When I was 20 years old I could hit an 80 mile an hour fastball. Today, I would be lucky to hit a 50 mile an hour fastball.
What's changed? The efficiency of my senses have changed. At 20 years old, my eyesight was 20/20. It certainly isn't today. In the words of one dominant scientific theory today, 'oxidation' has eroded the sensorary efficiency of my eyes relative to the biological function they are supposed to be performing for purposes of my survival. I made better 'sensory maps' of my environment back when I was 20 than I do now.
So to answer Kant's epistemological question in a way that I don't know whether he would have agreed with me or not (He would have been confused by the 'baseball analogy' because baseball hadn't been invented yet.) -- I say, we can partly directly, partly indirectly, know our objective world through our imperfect senses, some people of whom have better sensory systems than others, all of us subject to the oxidation and erosion of our senses over time, and all of us subject to the very imperfect and narcissistically biased nature of our logical-reasoning-evaluation process as well.
Thus, in relative to any particular situation, our 'epistemological glass' may range anywhere from 'almost completely empty' (no knowledge and/or very bad knowledge) to 'almost completely full' (very good knowledge). To change the analogy a bit here, based on the quality of our epistemological knowledge relative to a particular situaion, we could be running on a relatively full tank of gas or a relatively empty one.
Now on the other side of the 'younger vs. older' polarity -- an epistemological polarity that is very relavent to the Obama vs. McCain election competition -- I'd have to say that my overall experience and knowledge is much superior now to what it was when I was 20. It usually comes down to this: the younger the adult we are, the greater our energy level and sensory efficiency is; whereas the older we are, the greater our experience, knowledge, and wisdom is likely to be -- at least until our cognitive faculties start to seriously erode.
In Obama's defense, as others have pointed out before me, more experience does not always lead to better judgment.
And then -- like a dirty shirt -- there is always the factor of 'narcissistic bias'.
This is where Nietzsche's version of 'relativistic, post-modern, deconstructive epistemology' comes into effect.
For many of us, we hold up 'scientists' and 'doctors' as being our 'epistemological idols'. However, if a particular pharmaceutical company is a paying a particular scientist or group of scientists a lot of money to present a particular 'epistemological position' to the FDA or to the general public regarding the 'safety' of a particular medication -- and this 'epistemological position' is tainted/corrupted/pathologized by 'conflict of interest' -- the money the scientist is getting -- then obviously this type of 'epistemological knowledge is worse than useless, it's downright dangerous, and criminal.
This priniciple of 'narcissistic bias' and 'conflict of interest' also applies to philosophers who are being paid and/or threatened by kings and/or religious institutions; it applies equally to politicians who are being paid, directly or indirectly, a great deal of money by lobbyists who are lobbying for something important that they want (usually at the expense of the general public); and it applies equally to people who are paid or cajoled into 'altering the information on passports and birth certificates' which again reflects all of the following: narcissisic bias, conflict of interest, and 'cheating' and/or criminal intent.
From an epistemological and a narcissistic bias point of view, there is a lot less to worry about in the question: What are you sitting on? (A chair.) than there is in the question: Were the Chinese gymnasts under 16 years old? (Let's just say that probably like most of the rest of you, I have my strong suspicions that narcissistic bias has probably raised its ugly side, and had its dominant power influence -- again. We shall see what unfolds. Who was it Bonds, Palmeiro...? 'No, I've never taken steroids -- or at least knowingly. How about unknowingly, then? I know -- you thought you were taking vitamins. Or maybe you didn't want to destroy your career -- and your chances at the hall of fame and being a baseball legend -- by admitting to what you knew you were taking? How about that one? That one fits for me.)
Call me a 'post-Kantian' if you wish. Or maybe partly or mainly -- an 'anti-Kantian'. It depends on how you interpret Kant and his famous/infamous 'Critique of Pure Reason'.
For myself -- I've done enough interpreting for today.
-- dgb, Aug. 23rd, 2008.
.
-- dgb, Aug. 23rd, 2008.
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From Wikipedia...on the internet...see Kant...
Immanuel Kant (IPA: [ɪmanuəl kant]; 22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804) was an 18th-century German philosopher from the Prussian city of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia). He is regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of modern Europe and of the late Enlightenment.
His most important work is the Critique of Pure Reason, a critical investigation of reason itself. It encompasses an attack on traditional metaphysics and epistemology, and highlights Kant's own contribution to these areas. The other main works of his maturity are the Critique of Practical Reason, which concentrates on ethics, and the Critique of Judgement, which investigates aesthetics and teleology.
Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological priorities were to find out whether metaphysics, the science of ultimate reality, is possible. He asked if an object has certain properties prior to the experience of that object. He concluded that all objects that the mind can think about must conform to its manner of thought. Therefore if the mind can only think in terms of causality -- which he concluded that it does -- then we can know prior to experiencing them that all objects we experience must either be a cause or an effect. However, it follows from this, that it is possible that there are objects of such a nature that the mind cannot think of them, and so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside of experience: hence we cannot know, for example, whether the world always existed or if it had a cause. And so the grand questions of speculative metaphysics are off limits, but the sciences are firmly grounded in laws of the mind.[1]
In this sense, Kant believed himself to be creating a compromise between the empiricists and the rationalists. The former, according to Kant, believe that knowledge necessarily comes from experience, and that experience can yield only imperfect laws of nature, that past events do not predict future events. Therefore, there is no sound foundation for science. Knowledge of our selves, the external world and causality are off limits. The latter believed that reason alone provides us with certain truths that can provide a sound foundation for science. Kant said we can know some things through reason, but these things are only of how the world appears to us, and that the world we know is objective, compromising with the empiricists. But he also said that what we know through pure reason can only be applied to experience, and that it is through experience that we get most of our knowledge, compromising with the rationalists.
Kant’s thought was very influential in Germany while he was still alive, moving philosophy beyond the debate between the rationalists and empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer all saw themselves as correcting and expanding the Kantian system, thus bringing about German Idealism. Kant continues to be a major influence on philosophy to this day, influencing both Analytic and Continental Philosophy.
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From Wikiquote...on the internet...see Kant...
Critique of Pure Reason (1787)
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer. (Preface, A vii)
Abbot Terrasson tells us that if the size of a book were measured not by the number of its pages but by the time required to understand it, then we could say about many books that they would be much shorter were they not so short. (A xviii)
Criticism alone can sever the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which can be injurious universally; as well as of idealism and skepticism, which are dangerous chiefly to the Schools, and hardly allow of being handed on to the public. (Preface to 2nd edition, B xxxiv)
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. (B 1)
The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space. (B 8)
Thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. (B 75)
Sometimes paraphrased: "Concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind."
A plant, an animal, the regular order of nature—probably also the disposition of the whole universe—give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind—just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions; that, notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individually, unchangeably, and completely determined, and are the original causes of things; and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea. (B 374)
Metaphysics has as the proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality. (B 395)
Human reason is by nature architectonic. (B 502)
Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas. (B 730)
All the interests of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? (B 832-833)
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Kant vs. DGB Philosophy: Kant Re-visited
I will say this about Immanuel Kant: for me, he is the most difficult philosopher that I have ever had the cognitive pain -- or shall we say the cognitive exercise -- of trying to understand, of trying to figure out just exactly what he said and what he meant. Let us make the dualistic, and dialectic, distinction -- as Kant himself is most famously known for -- between: 1. Kant-the-person-in-himself-and-what-he-believed; vs. 2. my subjective understanding of the-either-knowable-and/or-unknowable-so-called-objective-Kant-and-what-he-believed.
Did you follow that distinction? This is as difficult as epistemology gets -- or at least it is where Kant took it, and where I am trying to follow. The 'subjective/objective' problem is arguably one of the two or three most difficult metaphysical problems in the history of philosophy. I put it right up there with the 'mind/body' dualism and the 'religion/atheism' dualism.
Now to be a 'dialectic philosopher' in the sense that I mean being a dialectic philosopher means that we seek to integrate or synthesize all dualities or apparent paradoxes/contradictions/polarities/conflicts/impasses. And so this is what we shall aim to do here.
Complicating the problem here, is the separate problem of 'sound and/or visual bites'.
I have read different authors -- different interpreters of Kant -- and come away with different interpretations of what Kant said and what he meant. This problem is critical to what we are trying to do here because if my understanding of Kant and what he said/meant is wrong, then everything that I write here is also wrong and subject to both re-interpretation and re-evaluation. Similarily, with anything I might have written previously about Kant and this same problem of the 'subjective/objective split'.
At the heart of the matter is this philosophical question: Can we directly know what is in our 'objective world'(Kant's outdated term for 'objective' was 'noumenal') and/or is it colored by the subjective nature of our own 'cognitive-evaluative processing brain-mind-psyche' -- specifically, the unique individual combination of our senses, percepts, power of reasoning/logic, understanding of 'causality', time, space, and structure, concepts, generalizations, abstractions, value-judgments...anything we use to help us (or hinder us) to better understand our 'objective world' and/or the 'thing-in-itself'?
This question -- the Kantian epistemological question -- encompasses two rather large 'semantic time-bombs' that turn the question into a 'epistemologist's living nightmare'. I think the question messed up a lot of people's minds back in Kant's day, as it is still at least partly doing today. Focus too hard on the question and your mind might explode. It will take you on one of those 'magic carpet rides' that I keep writing about relative to any philosopher who wants to 'fly high with you and not return you to the ground -- to the stability of the earth beneath your feet.' Certain philosophers -- to name a few -- Parmedines, Plato, Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Wittgenstein... -- have been very good at taking us on 'fly-high-with-me-magic carpet rides'. When reading them -- if we are dialectically bound by the cognitive interplay between the sky and the earth, between the abstract and the concrete particularities, then there comes a time when we are reading these philosophers when we have to blow the whistle on them, and tell them to either take us back to earth again -- or we are taking over the controls. Back to earth we go.
The crux of the semantic problem with the Kantian epistemological question are these two words: Can we directly know...?
That is the semantically loaded, time-bomb part of the question -- the part that will quite possibly drive you to drink, take you over the deep end, and/or cognitively blow your mind, if you focus too hard on it, and you don't see the potential 'double meaning contradiction' in the question.
Kant's epistemological question is very simlar to this one: Is the glass half full or half empty -- which is it?
If you fall for the question -- then you have been epistemologically trapped -- with no way out of this apparent epistemological conundrum.
Back up a moment -- and approach the question properly -- and you can become untrapped.
You answer the epistemological question the same way you answer the 'half-full, half-empty drink' question.
It depends on your perspective.
Are you an optimist or a pessimist?
Are you a Humean epistemological skeptic and pessimist; or are you a Hegelian epistemological idealist?
Or are you a Bainian multi-dialectic 'skeptic-pessimist-optimist'?; a Bainian multi-dialectic 'epistemological realist-idealist'?
Let's look at it this way. Every person's sensory-perceptual-conceptual-evaluative system is different -- and some are better than others. But even this is relative over time. Let me explain.
When I was 20 years old I could hit an 80 mile an hour fastball. Today, I would be lucky to hit a 50 mile an hour fastball.
What's changed? The efficiency of my senses have changed. At 20 years old, my eyesight was 20/20. It certainly isn't today. In the words of one dominant scientific theory today, 'oxidation' has eroded the sensorary efficiency of my eyes relative to the biological function they are supposed to be performing for purposes of my survival. I made better 'sensory maps' of my environment back when I was 20 than I do now.
So to answer Kant's epistemological question in a way that I don't know whether he would have agreed with me or not (He would have been confused by the 'baseball analogy' because baseball hadn't been invented yet.) -- I say, we can partly directly, partly indirectly, know our objective world through our imperfect senses, some people of whom have better sensory systems than others, all of us subject to the oxidation and erosion of our senses over time, and all of us subject to the very imperfect and narcissistically biased nature of our logical-reasoning-evaluation process as well.
Thus, in relative to any particular situation, our 'epistemological glass' may range anywhere from 'almost completely empty' (no knowledge and/or very bad knowledge) to 'almost completely full' (very good knowledge). To change the analogy a bit here, based on the quality of our epistemological knowledge relative to a particular situaion, we could be running on a relatively full tank of gas or a relatively empty one.
Now on the other side of the 'younger vs. older' polarity -- an epistemological polarity that is very relavent to the Obama vs. McCain election competition -- I'd have to say that my overall experience and knowledge is much superior now to what it was when I was 20. It usually comes down to this: the younger the adult we are, the greater our energy level and sensory efficiency is; whereas the older we are, the greater our experience, knowledge, and wisdom is likely to be -- at least until our cognitive faculties start to seriously erode.
In Obama's defense, as others have pointed out before me, more experience does not always lead to better judgment.
And then -- like a dirty shirt -- there is always the factor of 'narcissistic bias'.
This is where Nietzsche's version of 'relativistic, post-modern, deconstructive epistemology' comes into effect.
For many of us, we hold up 'scientists' and 'doctors' as being our 'epistemological idols'. However, if a particular pharmaceutical company is a paying a particular scientist or group of scientists a lot of money to present a particular 'epistemological position' to the FDA or to the general public regarding the 'safety' of a particular medication -- and this 'epistemological position' is tainted/corrupted/pathologized by 'conflict of interest' -- the money the scientist is getting -- then obviously this type of 'epistemological knowledge is worse than useless, it's downright dangerous, and criminal.
This priniciple of 'narcissistic bias' and 'conflict of interest' also applies to philosophers who are being paid and/or threatened by kings and/or religious institutions; it applies equally to politicians who are being paid, directly or indirectly, a great deal of money by lobbyists who are lobbying for something important that they want (usually at the expense of the general public); and it applies equally to people who are paid or cajoled into 'altering the information on passports and birth certificates' which again reflects all of the following: narcissisic bias, conflict of interest, and 'cheating' and/or criminal intent.
From an epistemological and a narcissistic bias point of view, there is a lot less to worry about in the question: What are you sitting on? (A chair.) than there is in the question: Were the Chinese gymnasts under 16 years old? (Let's just say that probably like most of the rest of you, I have my strong suspicions that narcissistic bias has probably raised its ugly side, and had its dominant power influence -- again. We shall see what unfolds. Who was it Bonds, Palmeiro...? 'No, I've never taken steroids -- or at least knowingly. How about unknowingly, then? I know -- you thought you were taking vitamins. Or maybe you didn't want to destroy your career -- and your chances at the hall of fame and being a baseball legend -- by admitting to what you knew you were taking? How about that one? That one fits for me.)
Call me a 'post-Kantian' if you wish. Or maybe partly or mainly -- an 'anti-Kantian'. It depends on how you interpret Kant and his famous/infamous 'Critique of Pure Reason'.
For myself -- I've done enough interpreting for today.
-- dgb, Aug. 23rd, 2008.
.
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